Abstract. When an agent decides whether to join or not a coalition, she must consider (1) the expected power of such a coalition as well as (2) her or her position in the vertical structure within the coalition, be it a firm, a party, or a gang. We establish that there exists a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration across ranks and the number of coalitions to be formed. Moreover, we show that in all stable systems the endogenous coalitions must be mixed and balanced in terms of members' abilities, with no segregation. (JEL Codes: C71, D71)
Introduction
Circumstances abound in which individual agents interact via the organizations they choose to belong to. From each agent's perspective, the consequences of joining an organization or another are defined by (i) what kind of outcome will be generated by the interaction of the organizations formed, and (ii) what will happen within the organization under that outcome, in particular, to the agent in question. The second aspect is likely to be determined by the internal structure of the organization and the agent's position in it.
In a political setting, for example, politicians form parties and members of each party decide on the party line and on the campaign strategy, given the perception of their strengths and the opponents' characteristics; then, the election outcome will be determined by what kind of parties have been formed and their relative strength; and finally, the members of the winning party will be allocated a role depending on their relative positions within the party, which will determine their payoffs. In this and other examples (e.g., gangs and entrepreneurial organization), the agents' ranks within the organization appear to be an important factor in determining their final payoffs.
1
Understanding what determines the number and composition of coalitions (party systems, market concentration, economic and political integration) has been a recurrent focus in many strands of literature (discussed below), but, to the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic existing work on the relationship between such horizontal segmentation incentives and the vertical structure of each endogenous organization. We believe that, especially in contexts in which the relevant agents are heterogeneous in ability, studying the interplay of these two dimensions could be very important.
2 This is what we do in this paper, through a cooperative game theory analysis that yields a number of sharp results in an institution-free environment.
The first key assumption of our model is that the relevant agents 3 have heterogeneous observable abilities, and the absolute strength of a coalition depends on the total ability of it's members. Second, we assume that each endogenous coalition must have a vertical structure, i.e., the coalition members must be ranked, or assigned to different tasks of rankable importance, and payoff shares must be non-decreasing in rank. In other words, the comparison of total abilities across coalitions is assumed to determine the coalitions' relative power (probability of winning or market share, depending on the application), whereas payoff division within each coalition is assumed to depend on the members' ranks in the vertical structure of the coalition. Then, given that abilities are observable, it is verified that competition between coalitions ensures that each coalition will endogenously assign internal ranks following the ability ordering.
For analytical tractability, the fundamental distribution of abilities will be captured by a unique parameter (geometric distribution of abilities). The role of hierarchy for internal payoff division will also be captured by a unique parameter, to be interpreted as the percentage drop in the relative payoff from one rank to the next, 1 Given that our focus is on the relationship between internal structure of coalitions and the competition between the endogenous coalitions, our model and results will relate more to the formation of competing parties, firms or gangs, than to the formation of clubs and jurisdictions, since typically club and jurisdiction formation models are about sorting or matching preferences (for example on local public goods), and the vertical differentiation dimension is not considered.
2 For example, the (small) literature on party formation focuses almost exclusively on the incentives that different institutional systems give to form parties to represent different (horizontal) segments of the voters' population, whereas the impact of internal organization of parties on the stability of different party systems is not studied and could be quite important: intuitively, the choice between becoming the leader of a new party or remaining at a lower rank of an existing party must depend on how the different ranks are treated. 3 We use the term "relevant" because in each application there could be agents like voters (in the political application), consumers (in the industrial organization application) and victims (in the criminal organizations application) that are important in general but not relevant for the decisions to merge, split or form strategic alliances.
which will be our measure or proxy for vertical inequality. 4 The expected utility of each member of each coalition will then depend on both parameters, one through her internal rank and the other through the expected power of the coalition, e.g., the expected profit share or probability of winning the office/seats.
The first part of the paper will study the conditions for the stability of different partitions of players (or coalition structures) as a function of these two parameters capturing the distribution of abilities and the distribution of payoffs within coalitions. In this part, the analysis follows the logic of Core stability of NTU games in the sense that payoff division or imputation rules are treated as given, and thus, the focus is on coalition formation only. Later, in the second part of the paper, we will examine what happens when the distribution of payoffs within coalitions is endogenized, while still keeping the vertical hierarchical constraint.
The results of the first part are summarized as follows: First, we find, for each integer K, an upper bound on vertical inequality for there to exist a stable partition consisting of K coalitions ("K-partition," for short), and this upper bound increases (more inequality allowed) as K increases;
5 Second, the reward of every rank in an organization belonging to a K-partition has to be between the marginal contribution in a K-partition and that in a (K − 1)-partition; Third, all stable partitions must be cyclic in the sense that each of K coalitions consists of every K-th player in ability ordering, and hence no two players in any K consecutive ability types may belong to the same coalition; Finally, and most importantly, the lower is the inequality of payoffs across ranks, i.e., the lower is vertical inequality, the smaller is the number of rival organizations that can be sustained in a stable partition of the relevant agents.
Next, we move on to characterize the set of "strongly stable systems," i.e., the levels of vertical inequality and coalition structures that survive coalitional deviations in which the players in each coalition can choose any level of vertical inequality as they wish. We first characterize the set of symmetric strongly stable systems, i.e., the set of strongly stable systems in which all existing coalitions use the same vertical inequality norm. Allowing for this type of endogeneity of vertical inequality, we obtain a very tight result: A system is strongly stable if and only if each agent receives her "marginal contribution"; given that the ability of the agent occupying each rank in the hierarchy decreases in K, the number of coalitions, it must be the case that the marginal contribution of each rank also decreases in K, implying higher 4 In most contexts one can think of, political or economic, people usually share some perception about the relative importance of the most recognized tasks or roles within organizations. However, this perception is never very precise and rarely people express their distributive views within an organization distinguishing in detail between vertical inequality at the top, middle and bottom. In other words, typically the views about how much vertical inequality there should be are expressed in a very synthetic or encompassing manner. Our assumption that vertical inequality can be captured by a unique parameter is just an extreme form of this behavioral observation. 5 Given that the marginal contribution of an agent assigned to a rank is decreasing in the number of rival organizations, K, the lower bound compensation of each rank for the system to be stable is also decreasing in K.
vertical inequality. In other words, endogenizing the vertical inequality norm allows us to show that partitions with any number of coalitions of players can be stable, together with an appropriate level of vertical inequality that increases in the number of coalitions. We will then extend the characterization to asymmetric strongly stable systems, i.e., systems in which different coalitions may adopt different levels of vertical inequality. We will show that indeed such asymmetric structures exist, with lower vertical inequality between ranks occurring in the stronger coalitions.
The paper is organized as follows: after a review of the related literature, in section 2 we introduce the model and in section 3 we prove a number of general results, providing first some necessary conditions for any stable partitions and then a complete characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of stable partitions. Section 4 fully characterizes strongly stable systems with endogenous vertical inequality. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper highlights at least two features of endogenous formation of rival organizations that can be contrasted with the previous literature on coalition formation: (1) the more skewed is the allocation of payoffs, the more fragmented will be the rival coalitions to be formed; and (2) coalitions consist of members from widely dispersed ability levels and thus, they have similar compositions. The latter is in contrast with the separation outcomes ("birds of a feather flock together") that are prevalent in the literature on some other types of group formation, such as clubs and jurisdictions providing local public goods. 6 The literatures on social classes (Akerlof 1997 (Demange, 2004, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006) , are all related in a broad sense to what we do, but our approach is distinguished from these studies by two key aspects: rivalry among endogenous coalitions and rank-dependent internal rewards. As a result, agents face a dilemma between teaming up with more able people for a more powerful coalition and teaming up with less able people for a higher internal rank. Damiano et al. (2010) consider a similar tension but in a setting where agents join fixed coalitions. 6 See e.g. Westhoff (1977) , Guesnerie and Oddou (1981) , Greenberg and Weber (1986) , Demange (1994) , Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1998), Casella (2001) , and Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001). The different jurisdictions provide different local public good quantities, and typically agents are not differentiated in terms of ability.
7 In Damiano et al. (2010) agents of different abilities choose between two organisations of fixed size when the agent's utility increases both in the average ability of the organisation (peer effect) and in her or internal ranking (pecking order effect). If the value of each coalition is a function of the average ability of agents, they obtain some degree of segregation of ability types, with a larger overlap when the pecking order effect is stronger. It differs from our setup in (i) no coalitional deviation allowed and (ii) a unilateral deviation is allowed when it increases the average ability of Like in this paper, Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) study co-determination of internal allocation and coalition structure, but they employ a non-cooperative approach to circumvent the problem of nonexistence of a stable coalition structure. In contrast, we seek to obtain sharp predictions by exploiting the hierarchical internal reward structure while keeping the cooperative approach.
8
In industrial organization applications, the incarnation of the question becomes: What explains the different concentration levels of different industries beyond economies of scale, and what determines the patterns of cooperation in R&D? 9 In political economy, one of the main questions is: What explains party formation and the different party structures across countries, even controlling for similarity of institutions and preferences?
10 For more distantly related work on trade alliance formation, see e.g. Yi (1996) and Casella and Feinstein (2002) . One could also ask similar questions in any other economic, political, or social arena in which the key players have the choice of forming coalitions of whatever size, and coalitions then compete for market or power shares.
We assume that groups can coordinate deviations, using Core-like cooperative logic. Hence, parties, firms and gangs are more natural types of coalitions to fit this logic than countries/jurisdictions where agents individually decide whether to move in or out. 11 In hedonic games coalitional deviations are allowed, but players care exclusively about the characteristics of their own coalition. In our game the players' utility depends on the rank in the coalition as well as on the realized relative power of the coalition, so it is not a proper hedonic game. Some more differences can be seen when comparing our model with a special type of hedonic games, namely Gamson games (see e.g. Le Breton, Ortuno-Ortin and Weber 2008): in such games N players of ordered ability or endowment sort into coalitions like in our model, but the total cake goes to whichever coalition has more than half of total talent, whereas our analysis includes settings where coalitions fight over market shares or power shares, with no magic value given to passing a fifty percent threshold. Moreover, we allow in principle hierarchy to determine different mappings from the distribution of ability to the distribution of payoffs.
the joining organisation even if some of its members get worse, so their solution concept is not akin to core-stability. The difference in outcomes (mixing rather than separation in our outcome) may be due to these differences. In fact, their results apply to very different contexts, like students' choices among fixed universities, rather than endogenous formation of organisations.
8 See Lucas and Thrall (1963)and Aumann and Drèze (1974) for some early study on the cooperative stability of coalition structures.
9 See e.g. Bloch (1995) . 10 On the importance of party formation and pre-election coalition formation across systems, see e.g. Levy (2004) , Morelli (2004) and Bandyopadhyay, Chatterjee and Sjöström (2010) . See also Dhillon (2005) for a survey.
11 Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) , for example, since they mostly focus on migration in and out of local jurisdictions because of different preferences over public goods, use stability notions that are based exclusively on individual behavior.
Model
Let there be an exogenous and large number N of players that compete for a contestable surplus. We conduct our analysis for the limit case of N → ∞, i.e., there are countably infinite agents. Each player i ∈ N has ability a i (which could be political ability, market ability, or crime ability depending on the application). We first introduce our specific assumptions on the distribution of abilities and on the importance of ability for coalitions; then we introduce the role of hierarchy within coalitions and the notion of stability of coalition structures.
Abilities and coalitional power
We order the players according to their ability, with the convention that a 1 > a 2 > · · · . In particular, we choose the simple functional form
where a ∈ (0, 1).
(
A coalition Z ⊂ N has "(absolute) strength" θ(Z) := i∈Z a i−1 , the sum of the members' abilities.
12 The "(relative) power" of a coalition Z depends on the comparison with the other coalitions: Specifically, in a partition
which in turn is equal to
can also be simply denoted as p(Z k ). 13 This feature exempts us from the unsettled issue of what the deviating coalition should expect regarding the response of the remaining agents.
Hierarchical payoffs and ability ranking
A key assumption of the model, which we will call henceforth "hierarchical payoff," is that each coalition must have a vertical hierarchy, and each coalition member's 12 The fact that the absolute strength of a party or coalition of parties increases with the total ability of it's members relates well to the idea that a party always benefits from more members, because of the mobilization (foot-soldiers) role. 13 The relative power p (which could be interpreted as probability of winning or power share or market share depending on the application) is a linear transformation of absolute power. When p is interpreted not as a relative power but as a probability of winning in a winner-take-all contest, then the utility of members of losing parties is normalized to 0. Since the decision by the relevant players about whether to form one coalition or another is ex ante, it doesn't matter whether p is a probability of winning in a winner-take-all system or a share in a proportional power sharing system. For the difference between the two in terms of voting incentives, see Herrera and Morelli (2010) .
share of the coalition's total payoff must be non-decreasing in the rank -the higher the rank, the higher the payoff. Formally, we capture the vertical inequality determined by the hierarchical payoff assumption with a single parameter, ρ ∈ (0, 1), which represents the ratio between the payoff of a coalition member and that of the member occupying the rank immediately above. As mentioned in the introduction, expressing the degree of vertical inequality with just one parameter is a simplifying assumption that nonetheless is broadly consistent with the impression that in most societies and most contexts the different views about the relative importance of different tasks and ranks are usually summarized by simple statements or positions.
14 Denoting the rank of player i in a coalition Z k ⊂ N by r i (Z k ), the expected utility of player i in Z k depends on the relative power of the coalition and decreases in her rank by a factor of ρ ∈ (0, 1):
This captures the idea that every agent should decide which coalition to join on the basis of the coalition's strength (the p(·) term) as well as on the basis of her rank in the coalition (r i ) and the vertical inequality expected (ρ). The term (1 − ρ) serves the purpose of normalizing the value of the total "cake" to one if the coalition has a countable infinity of players. 15 In any infinite coalition, i∈Z
Hence, for a coalition with infinite members, p(Z k ) could also be considered the "value" of such a coalition. In a political context, for example, even though the probability of winning of a party depends on the ability of the politicians involved, once a party grabs power and the various offices have to be filled, at that point the relative payoff of the various party members depends on their assigned rank (from 14 In the political economy literature it is very common to simplify the distributive views using a single parameter, like the preferred tax rate in a linear taxation system. This assumption is obviously as brutal as ours. 15 This utility function allows us to focus on the interplay between the strategic considerations in coalition formation and the number and size of endogenously formed coalitions, in an environment where no bound is imposed by diseconomies of scale on the size and number of coalitions to be formed. The cost of this normalization modelling choice is that in the (off-equilibrium) cases in which a finite coalition is formed, there would be some surplus loss. For example, with ρ = 2/3 a coalition Z of three players would have, conditional on winning (with some probability p(Z)), payoffs equal to 1/3 for the first ranked player, 2/9 for the second, and 4/27 for the third, which sum to 19/27 < 1. In the political competition example even this off-equilibrium situation can be justified: if a party wins the elections in spite of having only a very small number of members, it may cover only a small number of posts, while all the other payoffs it would have been able to collect from lower rank offices would be gone. The other implication of our payoff function assumption in the case of a finite coalition is that the total payoff distributed to the party members conditional on winning would depend on ρ. However, (i) this relationship between vertical inequality and the size of the cake doesn't interfere at all with the results for fixed ρ in Section 3, and (ii) in Section 4 where ρ is endogenous, players could use this dependence of the size of the cake on ρ to their advantage, hence making the value of a deviation with finite colleagues more attractive, and yet they do not do that.
president to secretary and so on), and these relative and absolute payoffs sometimes take the form of pre-specified rank-related wages.
Given that ability is observable, it is intuitive that in each coalition the ability ordering should dictate the rank assignments in the same order. Formally, this "ability ranking" assumption means that
Initially, we conduct our analysis assuming that each coalition adopts the ability ranking. Then, we will verify that ability ranking indeed prevails as a result of competition when the coalitions are free to assign ranks in any order of their choice. For any partition π = {Z 1 , Z 2 , · · · } of N, we adopt the convention of labeling the coalitions in the ability order of the most able member, or "leader' for short, i.e., we assume (without loss of generality) that 1 ∈ Z 1 and i k < i k+1 for all k = 1, 2, · · · , where
In summary, our main assumptions are that (1) people cooperate in a way that the power of a coalition is proportional to the aggregate ability of the coalition, and (2) payoffs are determined by a vertical hierarchy within coalitions. 16 
Stability
In Section 3 below, we assume that ρ is an exogenous parameter that every coalition will adopt 17 (for example, the vertical inequality between different political offices may be invariant to which party wins the election) and hence the notion of stability is akin to that of Core stability in a NTU game: a partition π is stable if there is no "viable" deviation/subset D of N that would give higher expected payoff to all members of D than in the original coalitions in the partition π.
In Section 4, we relax this assumption and thus, analyze a stronger notion of stability in environments where coalitions are free to choose their own ρ endogenously.
Characterization of Stable Partitions and Vertical Inequality
Given (a, ρ), a deviation D ⊂ N is viable relative to a partition π if
Other assumptions, like the geometric distribution of abilities and the constant ratio of payoffs between any pair of consecutive ranks, are needed in order to obtain clean analytical results, but they do not seem to be essential for the substantive correlations that we uncover in the paper. 17 We share the view that "often, the rewards from joint effort are shared according to rather rigid rules," as conveyed, e.g., by Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) where π(i) is the coalition Z k ∈ π such that i ∈ Z k , and the inequality is strict for some i ∈ D. A partition π is stable if there is no viable deviation relative to it. As mentioned earlier, initially we conduct our analysis taking it granted that every coalition adopts the ability ranking; In Section 3.4 we prove that every coalition will indeed do so in any stable partition with more than one coalitions.
Some general properties
The first thing to observe is that no coalition may consist of a finite number of members because such a coalition would always be able to find an agent who would be willing to join as the lowest rank member, either because she is ranked so low in another coalition or because her own coalition's power is negligible, as formalized below.
Lemma 1 In any stable partition, every coalition is a countably infinite set.
Proof. To reach a contradiction, suppose there is a finite coalition, say Z f , in a stable partition π. Let be the least able member of Z f . If there is an infinite coalition, say Z i ∈ π, then there exists a large enough j ∈ Z i such that j > and
Thus, D = Z f ∪{j} would constitute a viable deviation because the coalition's strength increases relative to Z f , i.e., θ(D) > θ(Z f ), while the ranks of members of Z f are intact and thus, their payoffs are higher. This would contradict the supposed stability of the partition. If all coalitions of π are finite, on the other hand, there are infinitely many coalitions and consequently, there exists a large enough j such that agent j is the most able agent of a coalition, say Z ∈ π, and θ(Z )(1 − ρ) < θ(Z f )(1 − ρ)ρ , leading to an analogous contradiction that Z f ∪ {j} would be a viable deviation.
Proof. If θ(Z k ) ≤ θ(Z k+1 ) for some k, the deviation {i k } ∪ Z k+1 \ {i k+1 } would be viable where i k and i k+1 are the most able members of Z k and Z k+1 , respectively.
In words, Lemma 2 asserts that in any stable partition the strength of coalitions decreases with the ability of its leader because otherwise, the more able leader of a weaker coalition would be happy to replace the less able leader of a stronger coalition, which would be welcomed by the latter coalition.
By the same token, if a rank of a weaker coalition is occupied by a more able agent than the same rank of a stronger coalition, then an analogous swap of the agents for that rank would constitute a viable deviation. Thus, for any member i of any coalition in a stable partition, every stronger coalition must have more members who are more able than i than i's own coalition does. In fact, we prove a stronger result: For any two consecutively ranked members of a weaker coalition, exactly one agent exists in each stronger coalition whose ability is between them (Lemma 3).
Consider any two coalitions Z k and Z k in a stable partition π where k < k . Let i be the least able among the agents in Z k who are more able than the leader of Z k , say i . Let j be the agent who is the next rank to i in Z k , i.e., r i (Z k ) + 1 = r j (Z k ). To reach a contradiction, suppose that there are more than one agents in Z k who are between i and j in ability, and let j be the least able among them. Note that i < i < j < j and thus, every agent in Z k \ {i } prefer D = (Z k \ {i }) ∪ {i} to Z k because their coalition becomes stronger, i.e., θ(D) > θ(Z k ), while maintaining their ranks. For the deviation D to be not viable, therefore, the agent i should be worse off in D, i.e.,
At the same time, for the deviation D = (Z k \ {j}) ∪ {j } to be not viable, since all agents in Z k \ {j} prefer D to Z k , the agent j should be worse off in D , i.e.,
Since r j (Z k ) ≥ 2, (5) and (6) lead to a contradictory conclusion that
This establishes that there must be exactly one agent in Z k whose ability is between i and j. Extending this result, we show in the next lemma that agents in Z k ∪ Z k who are no more able than the leader of Z k , alternate between the two coalitions in their ability ordering.
Lemma 3 Let Z k and Z k be two coalitions in a stable partition π where k < k . For any two adjacently ranked agents in Z k , exactly one agent exists in Z k whose ability is between them.
Proof. See Appendix.
One implication of this lemma is:
Lemma 4 Any stable partition consists of a finite number of coalitions.
Proof. Consider a partition π = {Z k } k∈N consisting of infinitely many coalitions. Let Z 1 = {1, 2 1 , 3 1 , · · · }, i.e., agent j 1 is rank j in Z 1 . By Lemma 3, for π to be stable, ∆ j = j 1 − (j − 1) 1 must weakly increase in j = 2, 3, · · · , without bound. Let be the smallest j such that ∆ j > 1. For every k, let (j
1−a k ) > 0 where the inequality follows since
Therefore, we consider finite partitions in the sequel. Consider an arbitrary stable
This places a lower bound on ρ for stability of K-partitions as stated in Lemma 5. This bound decreases in K, which implies that the degree of vertical inequality potentially allowed in a stable partition increases with the number of coalitions.
Lemma 5 A necessary condition for any K-partition to be stable is that ρ ≥ a K .
Grand Coalition
When is the grand party Z G = N stable? Suppose there is a viable deviation D and let i be the first rank of D: He has a payoff of
Note that the latter is largest when D consists of all players j ≥ i, in which case p(D) = (1 − a) n≥i a n−1 = a i−1 . Thus, no deviation is viable if
In conjunction with Lemma 5 above and Lemma 6 below, we establish
Proposition 1
The grand coalition constitutes a stable partition if and only if ρ ≥ a. Furthermore, there is no other stable partition if ρ ≥ a.
Multiple Coalitions
Lemma 5 provides a lower bound, ρ ≥ a K , for a stable K-partition. We now derive an upper bound of ρ.
Consider an arbitrary stable K-partition.
For k = 2, we have
1−a 2 by Lemma 3. Thus, (8) for k = 2 implies that ρ < a
Hence, ρ < a is necessary for a stable K-partition. This, together with Lemma 5, establishes
The upper bound identified above, ρ < a, is not a tight upper bound as we show below. It proves useful to introduce a specific partition structure: A "cyclic"
Suppose there exists a cyclic K-partition π
In conjunction with Lemma 6, therefore, a necessary condition for a cyclic K-partition to be stable is
We now show that this is also a sufficient condition for the cyclic K-partition to be stable. First, consider the deviation of "i-onward break-off" from Z k , i.e., by
Since this condition is independent of j ∈ Z 
, which is postulated to hold for j = ∈ D. Since this inequality is independent of j, it further follows that Consequently, we only need to ensure that there is no viable infinite deviation. Consider an infinite D. For each n ∈ D, let e n = r n (D)−r n (Z k ) where n ∈ Z k . Note that if {e n |n ∈ D} is unbounded above then D is not viable since there is n large enough such that n's payoff is lower in
* } if such h ∈ Z 2 exists. Proceeding recursively, one can find
As we show in the Appendix (in the proof of Proposition 2), if an infinite deviation D is viable relative to π c K , then so is D * . Consequently, by delineating the conditions under which no deviation of the form D h ∪ Z h k is viable for any h ≥ 1 and k = 1, 2, · · · , K, we verify that the cyclic K-partition is stable if and only if (10) holds. The lower bound is the condition that no "break-off" deviation is viable as explained above; The upper bound is the condition that members of Z K would not recruit player 1 as their leader because the enhanced power (winning probability) from the recruitment is overshadowed by the payoff reduction from their ranks going down by one.
This result is formalized in Proposition 2 below. Relative to the area that may support a stable K-partition but no stable (K − 1)-partition, the fraction of this area converges to 1 as K → ∞. Figure 1 illustrates the areas that support stable cyclic K-partitions. Proof. In Appendix. We now show that there does not exist any stable partition that is not cyclic, so that the areas in Figure 1 are precisely the areas for which a stable K-partition exists. The following is a key lemma for this.
Lemma 7 Let Z k and Z k be two coalitions in a K-partition π K where k < k . Let y be the leader of Z k ; and let x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x be, in that ability order, the agents in Z k who are more able than y. If y − x = x j+1 − x j for all j = 1, · · · , − 1, then π K is not stable.
Recall Lemma 3 which says that between any two coalitions their members alternate in ability ordering except possibly for the top ability group of agents who may belong to the stronger coalition. Lemma 7 says that this top group of agents may not be superior to the leader of the weaker coalition by a certain degree. Essentially, these lemmas mean that coalitions have similar compositions in stable partitions. The proofs are relatively lengthy, so are deferred to Appendix.
We are now ready to establish that no non-cyclic partition may be stable. Observe from Lemma 7 that any partition is not stable so long as {1, · · · , } ⊂ Z 1 and + 1 ∈ Z 2 for some ≥ 2.
Hence, focus on partitions such that 1 ∈ Z 1 and 2 ∈ Z 2 . To reach a contradiction, suppose that such a partition is stable but non-cyclic. Let K ≥ 3 be the second rank agent of Z 1 . Then, by Lemma 3, j ∈ Z j for all j = 2, · · · , K − 1. Find m ≥ 1 such that m (K − 1) + j ∈ Z j for all j = 1, · · · , K − 1, for all m = 1, · · · , m − 1, but m(K − 1) + j ∈ Z j for some j = 1, · · · , K − 1. Such m exists since the partition is assumed non-cyclic. Let κ be such that m(K − 1) + κ ∈ Z κ while m(K − 1) + j ∈ Z j for all j < κ. If m(K − 1) + κ ∈ Z j for j < κ, the partition is not stable by Lemma 3 (applied for k = j and k = κ). By Lemma 3, therefore,
If κ = 1, then m ≥ 2 by supposition (if m = 1 then m(K − 1) + 1 = K ∈ Z 1 as posited above). Then, by Lemma 7 (applied for k = 1 and k = K), the partition is not stable.
Alternatively, suppose κ ∈ {2, · · · , K − 1}. First, consider the case that m ≥ 2. Since m (K − 1) + κ ∈ Z κ for all m = 1, · · · , m − 1, by Lemma 7 (applied for k = κ and k = K), the partition is not stable.
It remains to consider the case that κ ∈ {2, · · · , K − 1} and m = 1. For the deviation Z 1 \ {1} not to be viable, we need θ(
. For the deviation D = Z K ∪ {κ} not to be viable, since the agent κ would be strictly better off in D than in Z κ , we need θ(
κ−1 holds since Lemma 3 implies, for every n ∈ N, that y n − x n+1 ≥ K where y n and x n+1 are the agents with ranks n and n + 1 in Z K and Z 1 , respectively. This establishes the desired result stated below.
Proposition 3 All stable partitions are cyclic.
Theorem 1 A stable K-partition exists if and only if (10) holds; Furthermore, it is the cyclic K-partition.
Endogenous ability ranking
We have conducted the whole analysis so far under the assumption that any coalition with any set of members would always rank them according to ability. Before showing that this can actually be a property rather than an assumption, let's first discuss a couple of intuitions about why this should be the case in reasonable enriched models that allow for some explicit technological reasons behind the hierarchical structure. One technology that guarantees that every coalition would order it's members according to ability is the assumption that the value of each task for the coalition is the minimum of the ability of the person doing that task and that of the supervisor. 18 Moreover, if two tasks have different sensitivity to ability, and if the party as a whole cares about the total value or quality of the performance, then the higher ability member would have to be assigned to the more sensitive task.
In any case, even without adding any technological assumption like the above mentioned ones, we prove below that ability ranking must hold in every stable partition due to the competitive pressure. 
Proposition 4
In any stable partition with K ≥ 2, all coalitions must satisfy "ability ranking".
Proof. Suppose there is a stable partition π with reversed ranking within coalitions. Then, for any pair of agents i and j in the same coalition, say Z k , such that i < j yet j is ranked higher than i, switch the ranking of i and j. In the new ranking system, the partition is still stable. To verify this, suppose to the contrary that it is not stable in the new ranking system. Then, a viable deviation D, with a deviation ranking d : D → N, exists that includes either i or j. If D included only i, then the same D with d would be viable relative to the old ranking as well, because i is less happy in the old ranking. If D included only j, then D and d, with j replaced by i, would be viable relative to the old ranking, because i in the old ranking is equally happy as j in the new ranking. If D included both i and j, then the same D with d that switches the ranking of i and j, would be viable relative to the old ranking, because i (j) in the old ranking is equally happy as j (i) in the new ranking.
By sequentially switching the reversed ranks in the manner described above, therefore, we can construct a new ranking of the same partition that satisfies the ability ranking. 19 Then, π in the ability ranking must be cyclic by Theorem 1. This means that for any pair i and j in a coalition, there is an agent in between in another coalition. Then, the Lemma 8 dictates that no reversed ranking exists in the old ranking system.
Endogenous ρ and Strongly Stable Systems
We now extend the notion of stability to environments in which the "allocation rule," ρ, is endogenously determined within each coalition. Since ρ can be different across coalitions now, we define a "system" to be a pair (π, ρ) consisting of a K-partition π and a vector ρ = ( ρ 1 , · · · , ρ K ) that specifies one ρ k ∈ (0, 1) for each coalition Z k of π. A system is strongly stable (s-stable) if there does not exist a deviation (D, ρ ) that is viable in the sense that every member of D is weakly (some strictly) better off in D than in (π, ρ) conditional on ρ being the allocation rule in D: That is, recalling that π(i) denotes the coalition in π to which agent i belongs to,
where the inequality is strict for some i ∈ D. First, we focus on "symmetric" systems in the sense that the same ρ prevails for all coalitions, i.e., with ρ = (ρ, ρ, · · · , ρ) for some ρ ∈ (0, 1). For notational simplicity, we denote a symmetric system by (π, ρ). It is immediate from the definitions that if a symmetric system (π, ρ) is s-stable then π is stable given ρ. 19 In the proofs of Lemmas 3, 7, and Proposition 3, the ranking of agents j > J for a sufficiently large J do not matter. Hence, the Proposition can be strengthened as follows: If a K-partition π K , when restricted to agents j ≤ J for some J ∈ N, differs from the cyclic K-partition although ability ranking is honored for them (allowing the possibility that the ability ranking is violated for agents j > J), then π K is not stable. Therefore, the argument works with only a finite number of switching even if there may be infinite instances of reversed ranking in the original partition under consideration.
We start with a grand-coalition system (π G , ρ) where π G = {N}, and show that it is s-stable only if ρ = a. To see this, fix a system (π G , ρ) where ρ ≥ a and consider deviations (D m , ρ ) for m = 1, 2, · · · , where D m = {1 + jm|j = 0, 1, 2, · · · } consists of agent 1 and every m-th agents (i.e., all agents i ∈ N such that i = 1 mod m, or equivalently, i − 1 is divisible by m). The deviation (D m , ρ ) is viable if
with some strict inequality. The inequality (15) holds for j = 0 if
and holds for all j ≥ 1 as well if, in addition, ρ ≥ ρ m . Thus, one can find
Since it is straightforward to show that
is strictly increasing 20 in ρ ∈ (0, 1) for m > 1, (16) holds so long as ρ > a, and consequently, a system (π G , ρ) is not s-stable if ρ > a. It is not s-stable for ρ < a, either, because π is not stable given ρ < a.
It remains to check s-stability of the system (π G , a). Suppose there is a viable (D, ρ ), i.e., (14) holds for ρ = a and
If = min D > 1, considerD = {j|j = i − + 1 for some i ∈ D}, a deviation consisting of agents with indices − 1 lower than those in D (so that, in particular, 1 ∈D). Then, (17) holds forD as well because both sides of the inequality are divided by a −1 . Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that a viable
Finally, consider the possibility that ρ < a for a viable (D, ρ ). If j∈D\{1} a j−1 ≥ j∈D a j−1 · ρ , then for all i ∈ D \ {1}, we would have
The derivative of
where the last inequality follows from (D, ρ ) being viable. Note that this would imply that (D \{1}, ρ ) would also be viable. Then, by the same argument as before, (D, ρ ) would be viable as well whereD = {j|j = i − + 1 for some i ∈ D \ {1}} and = min(D \ {1}). Hence, consider (D, ρ ) instead of (D, ρ ). Repeating this process if necessary, we may assume that (D, ρ ) is viable with ρ < a, 1 ∈ D, and j∈D\{1} a j−1 < j∈D a j−1 · ρ . This last inequality, however, would imply that (1 − ρ ) j∈D a j−1 < 1, contradicting (17) for i = 1. This verifies that (D, ρ ) cannot be viable for ρ < a, either. Thus, we have shown that (π G , a) is the only s-stable symmetric system that supports the grand coalition. In fact, this result generalizes to cyclic partitions as below.
Proposition 5 For every a ∈ (0, 1) and K ∈ N, the symmetric system (π 
with some strict inequalities. The inequality (18) holds for j = 0 if
and holds for all j ≥ 1 as well if, in addition, ρ ≥ ρ m . Thus, one can find ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that (D m , ρ ) is viable if
Since
is strictly increasing in ρ ∈ (0, 1) for m > 1 as mentioned earlier, (19) holds so long as ρ > a K and consequently, a system (π c K , ρ) is not s-stable if ρ > a K . It remains to check the s-stability of the system (π c K , a K ). Observe that the equilibrium payoff of agent i in the system (π
where k(i) is the first-ranked agent in the coalition that i belongs to in π c K (so that i's rank in the coalition is (i − k(i))/K). That is, the equilibrium payoff of
is the same as that in the system (π G , a). Since the payoffs of members in a deviation are independent of the system they deviate from, therefore, we deduce that if a deviation (D, ρ ) were viable relative to (π c K , a K ) then it would be viable relative to (π G , a) as well. Consequently, since we have shown above that no deviation is viable relative to (π G , a), it follows that the same is true relative to
Observe that for every a ∈ (0, 1) there are multiple s-stable symmetric systems:
2 }, · · · . Furthermore, every agent i is indifferent across such symmetric s-stable systems because her payoff is the same at (1 − a)a i−1 in all such systems (payoff equivalence).
21 Therefore, a system should be s-stable, symmetric or not, so long as every agent gets this payoff. This is possible in so far as each coalition is lifted from a cyclic K-partition for some K, along with the allocation rule ρ = a K . We refer to such a system as a "generalized-cyclic" system, formalized as: A system (π, ρ) is a generalized-cyclic system if each coalition Z k consists of every κ-th agent starting from a first ranked agent, say i k , with ρ k = a κ , i.e.,
We establish that a system is s-stable if and only if it is of this form.
Theorem 2 A system (π, ρ) is s-stable if and only if it is a generalized-cyclic system.
Proof. The logic underlying Lemma 1 does not reply on ρ being common to all coalitions. Consequently, all coalitions in any (strongly) stable partition will consist of infinite members, which we take as granted below.
Consider an arbitrary generalized-cyclic system (π, ρ), so that every agent i has a payoff of (1 − a)a i−1 . If a deviation (D, ρ ) were viable relative to this system, then D would be viable relative to a s-stable symmetric system, e.g., (π G , a). Since this would be a contradiction, any generalized-cyclic system must be s-stable.
Next, to reach a contradiction, suppose there is a s-stable system (π, ρ) that is not a generalized-cyclic one. Then, there is a coalition Z k that is not of the form (20) , so that for any two consecutively ranked members, their payoff ratio in the system (π, ρ) is constant at ρ k , but their payoff ratio in a s-stable symmetric system, say (π G , a), is not constant. Note that the sum of the members' payoffs of Z k is (1 − a)θ(Z k ) in (π, ρ), and that in the system (π G , a) is also i∈Z
21 This payoff coincides with the Shapley value of the TU coalitional game derived from our game by defining the value of Z ⊂ N as v(Z) = i∈Z u i (Z). This game is superadditive with the feature that the marginal contribution of each agent i is (1−a)a i−1 whenever she joins an infinite coalition. Consequently, it is not hard to verify that the payoff allocation that imputes each agent this level of marginal contribution is in the core. Given the restriction of our setting that in each coalition the imputation is governed by a single parameter, ρ, the generalized-cyclic systems defined below are the only configurations in which the same imputation may be achieved.
Therefore, there must exist a member of Z k , say j 1 , whose payoff in the system (π, ρ) is strictly lower than (1 − a)a j 1 −1 , whence there is a sufficiently low ρ > 0 such that u = (1 − a)(1 − ρ )a j 1 −1 exceeds her payoff in (π, ρ). For each r = 2, 3, · · · , one can find a member, say j r , of Z k whose rank is so low that her payoff in the system (π, ρ) falls short of u · (ρ ) r−1 , maintaining the feature that j r < j r+1 . Then, the deviation D = {j 1 , j 2 , · · · }, together with ρ , would be viable because agent j r would have a payoff of (1 − a)(1 − ρ )θ(D )(ρ ) r−1 > u · (ρ ) r−1 , which constitutes a contradiction.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown some important connections between the role of hierarchy within coalitions and the endogenous formation of coalition structures. In order to best emphasize the connection, we have first characterized how different distributions of abilities and distributions of payoffs along a single hierarchical structure determine which coalition structures can be stable. Then we have shown that when the role of hierarchy is endogenous, partitions consisting of any number of coalitions can be strongly stable, for any distribution of abilities in the considered class, as long as each agent receives a payoff that is her marginal contribution. Since in a cyclic partition the agent occupying a given rank in a coalition must have lower ability when the number of coalitions is larger, this implies that vertical inequality must indeed increase in the number of coalitions.
One limitation of our model is that the value of a coalition does not depend on the partition of the rest of the players, while, for example, in plurality rule elections it makes a big difference for a coalition expecting 30 percent of the votes whether the rest is divided in 7 small parties of 10 percent each or two other parties of 35 each. This limitation may not be important if balanced (e.g., cyclic) partitions are to be expected to prevail. However, when the presence of other dimensions or constraints makes it possible for asymmetric coalition structures to emerge, then we expect that the value of a coalition should reflect these asymmetries in the partition of others. An extension of the model in which the relative power of any coalition depends not only on the ability of it's members but also on some other dimension, like the exogenous distribution of voters' preferences, is in our future research agenda. 22 We note that our cooperative game theoretic results have the potential to be implementable and extendable in a dynamic stability setting like the one introduced by Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008) , since the lack of commitment that constitutes their main tenet is conceptually or implicitly assumed even in our core-like cooperative logic. A dynamic stability analysis would therefore be a natural next step of this research, perhaps confirming that multiple steady states with different coalition structures and, accordingly, with different vertical inequality levels, can exist, in line with our Theorem 2.
A final remark or two about the potential empirical relevance of our findings are in order: In the literature on the number of parties, for example, the leading hypotheses elaborated and tested have all to do with the electoral formula (Duverger's law and Duverger's hypothesis), but it is well documented that even controlling for the electoral formula the number of parties of different countries varies enormously (think of India and the United States in the set of countries using a majoritarian system and Ireland and Italy within the set of countries using a more proportional system). Within each set of countries with homogeneous electoral institutions, one could verify whether vertical inequality across the major ranks of each party is indeed higher in countries with a larger number of stable parties. Similarly, dividing the US production of goods and services in a number of categories, we could evaluate income distribution across ranks in each industry or category and see if higher hierarchical inequality is correlated with a lower concentration in the sector (of course controlling for economies of scale and other relevant differences across sectors). However, verifying or falsifying our theoretical result is not going to be easy: first of all, Willis and Rosen (1979) rejected empirically the hypothesis that the ability or talent that matter for distribution of wages can be one dimensional; second, when evaluating in the aggregate, one could argue that increasing inequality and increasing concentration are the trends. These two observations suggest to us that in most empirical attempts the skill premium or any other reason for an increased inequality across skills would trump any trend related to each separate skill taken in isolation. Aggregate inequality changes because of increased importance of some skills and decreased importance of others, while our theory refers to inequality of treatment of people who are judged on the basis of the same type of ability. So, perhaps the best type of situations where our relationship could be verified may be by looking at hierarchical inequality of research scientists when comparing, for example, the pharmaceutical industry and the bio-tech sector, in the the latter sector of which there are many more firms and vertical inequality might possibly be proved to be higher.
To reach a contradiction, suppose that there are m > and m > m with the following property: all players j ∈ Z k ∪ Z k such that m ≤ o(j) ≤ m belong to the same coalition. Without loss of generality, suppose m is the smallest such integer. We first consider the case that they all belong to Z k , but the same argument works when they all belong to Z k as well, as shown later.
That
}, all remaining members of Z k are strictly better off because the coalition's strength increased while their rankings remain the same. For the original partition to be stable, therefore, player o −1 ( + 1) should be worse off in this deviation, i.e.,
Note that, by retaking m if necessary, we may assume
while their rankings remain the same. Thus, the payoff
, which is impossible because (21) implies that the former payoff level is higher than the latter as calculated below:
where the first inequality follows from (21) . For completeness, we now consider the alternative case that all players j ∈ Z k ∪Z k such that m ≤ o(j) ≤ m belong to Z k . In the deviation (Z k ∪{ })\{ +1}, all remaining members of Z k is strictly better off because the coalition's strength increased while their rankings remain the same. For the original partition to be stable, therefore, player should be worse off in this deviation, i.e.,
Note that we may assume m +1 ∈ Z k without loss of generality. In the deviation D = (Z k ∪ {m }) \ {m + 1}, all members of D ∩ Z k are better off in D because θ(D) > θ(Z k ) while their rankings remain the same. Thus, the payoff of player The second part of the Proposition follows from the observation that
converges uniformly to 0 as K → ∞ on [0,ā] for allā < 1. QED.
Proof of Lemma 7:
Suppose to the contrary that ≥ 2 and y − x = x j+1 − x j = b ≥ 1 is constant for all j = 1, 2, · · · , − 1, yet the partition π K is stable.
For notational ease, let x denote the most able agent in Z k , i.e., x = x 1 . Then, x j = x + (j − 1)b for j ≤ ; and x = y − b. Note from Lemma 3 that k ≥ b + 1, so that
Note, in particular, that θ(Z k ) = a y−1 1−a b is not possible because the equality would imply that the partition under consideration has to be a cyclic K-partition. Furthermore, since Lemma 3 also implies, for every n ∈ N, that y n+1 − x +n ≥ b + 1 where y n+1 and x +n are the agents with ranks n + 1 and + n, respectively, in Z k and Z k , we deduce that
For the deviation Z k \ {x, x 2 , · · · , x −2 } not to be viable, we need
.
For the deviation Z k ∪ {x } not to be viable, on the other hand, we need either .
The RHS of both (26) and (27) increase in θ(Z k ) and θ(Z k ), respectively. Thus, the inequalities (26) and (27) 
or equivalently, by taking log and subtracting, if ∆ := log θ(Z k )
for all feasible θ(Z k ) as per (24) . Note that ∆ = 0 when = 2 because then y = x + 2b so that (34) where α = a b . Hence, it boils down to showing that f (α) = α ( −1) − 1 − α ( −2) ( − 1)(α − 1) < 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1), which is the case because f (α) = −α −3 (α − 1)( − 1)( − 2) > 0 and f (1) = 0. This proves that (26) and (27) cannot hold simultaneously.
This means that (28) must hold. Then, for the deviation Z k ∪ {x, x + b, · · · , x + ( − 1)b} not to be viable, we need
Since θ(Z k ) < θ(Z k ) + 
